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ABSTRACT 
 
Low probability, high consequence events within the oil, gas and chemical 
industries can have devastating effects on employees, facilities, companies, and the 
surrounding communities. Incidents such as the Bhopal gas leak and the explosion in 
West, Texas highlight the need for preventative measures such as land-use planning 
(LUP).  LUP is the process of analyzing and assessing potential hazards in facilities to 
mitigate the effects of such events by taking into consideration their impact when 
decisions are made concerning the siting of new facilities, modification of existing 
facilities and the proposal for new developments near existing facilities. Unfortunately, a 
method of best practice for LUP in the United States has yet to be identified. 
Implementation of LUP is complicated by various approaches, methodologies, 
government enforcement and factors that must be considered. Yet, it is clear that action 
is necessary to protect local communities and mitigate the effects of incidents at 
hazardous chemical facilities.  
LUP policies throughout the world have been implemented based upon the three 
main approaches of generic safety distances, consequences, and risks. Countries are 
actively practicing aspects of each approach, with the latter two used more extensively. 
Each approach and policy contains a unique set of pros and cons dependent upon the 
environment in which it is implemented. Evaluating current approaches, existing LUP 
policies and identifying the key elements of each are imperative to identifying possible 
improvements for the United States. Currently in the U.S. there are no federal 
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regulations encompassing LUP for hazardous chemical facilities and the land 
surrounding them. The authority to regulate private land use has primarily been handed 
down to the local communities who have historically done very little to mitigating risks. 
There is a lack of regulations providing guidance for owners/operators of facilities, local 
communities, and governmental oversight in the event of LUP issues around hazardous 
chemical facilities.  
Jurisdiction confusion and the Fifth Amendment, among other factors, create 
hurdles for implementing and enforcing a LUP policy within the States. Economic 
diversity between the 50 states of the U.S. further complicates the issue. It would be 
hard-pressed to implement a single approach that works best for all states. 
Implementation and best practice of LUP in the U.S. may be a combination of existing 
approaches from other countries with built in flexibility that allows each state to choose 
what works best for them.  
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
COMAH Control of Major Accident Hazards 
DOT Department of Transportation 
EO Executive Order 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 
GHS Globally Harmonized System 
GSD Generic Safety Distances 
HSE Health & Safety Executive (UK) 
HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
LFL Lower Flammability Limit 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
 vii 
 
LPA Local Planning Authority 
LUP Land-Use Planning 
NFPA National Fire Protection Association 
OCA Off-Site Consequence Analysis 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PADHI Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Instillations 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The catastrophic effects of major oil, gas and chemical incidents such as the 
explosion in West, Texas, have brought about a negative perception of the industry. The 
major contribution to this perception has been the escalation of incidents into disasters 
by inadequate land-use planning (LUP). LUP is the process of analyzing and assessing 
potential hazards in oil, gas and chemical facilities, which may pose potential conflicts 
with surrounding areas. The goal of LUP is to ensure that the impacts of potential 
incidents are taken into consideration to mitigate or prevent future disasters to the land 
surrounding a hazardous chemical facility. In addition, LUP is not limited to the 
construction of new facilities; it also applies to the modification of an existing facility 
and in the event of a community encroaching upon a facility that has been in operation 
for years. Unfortunately, a method of best practice for LUP implementation has yet to be 
identified.  
The roots of LUP go back to hundreds of years when city ordinances separated 
industrial and residential zones within city limits. Traditionally, this has been enforced 
by permitting for subdivisions and industrial parts within city limits. This separation has 
been based upon nuisance effects such as noise, heavy traffic, pollution or odor; 
however, this approach does not account for major hazards that have led to the negative 
perception of the industry.  
Right now, there are local communities at risk due to the operations of oil, gas, 
and chemical facilities. In many instances, the public is unaware of the risk they live 
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with on a daily basis. Economic development has often taken precedence over proper 
LUP. The historically reactive response to safety and LUP within the chemical industry 
and governments has led to implementation of preventative measures or regulations only 
after an incident has occurred. Major incidents such as the gas leak at Bhopal, India, the 
ammonium nitrate explosion in Toulouse, France, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 
West, Texas, and the deadly explosion at a storage warehouse in Tianjin, China have 
destroyed communities and taken the lives of many! Yet the U.S. still does not have a 
policy in place to mitigate such incidents with the use of LUP. The toxic gas release in 
Bhopal, India happened back in 1984, in 2001, the explosion at a fertilizer factory in 
France, then another explosion in Texas in 2013 and then yet another explosion in China 
in 2015. These tragedies continue to take place and are going to continue to take place 
unless preventative action is taken. An EPA report points out that there were 17 toxic 
releases, in 25 years preceding 1989, in the U.S. that exceeded the volume and level of 
toxicity of the Bhopal release. However, the lack of people and establishments in the 
areas surrounding these releases saved casualties [1].  
Unfortunately, the U.S. and even the world are far from a best practice of 
implementing and enforcing LUP. LUP policy is nonexistent is some countries, 
developing or being modified in some, and fully developed in a few others. A definitive 
best practice is missing, and the lack of LUP policy in some countries is disheartening. 
The issue of LUP is dynamic and complex in its need to address how to handle proposals 
for new facilities, modifications to existing facilities, and existing facilities that already 
pose a threat to local communities. The interest of different levels and departments of 
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government, agencies, developers, landowners, local residents, and other members of the 
public and organizations complicate it even further. If LUP is, so community driven how 
can we incorporate big government or have a federal regulation and make it work? How 
can LUP be better? How can it be implemented and enforced in the U.S.?  
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2. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT 
 
 This research and thesis was brought about by the clear lack of federal and state 
zoning laws currently in the U.S. that have cumulated into avoidable risk for local 
communities. Inadequate LUP has allowed communities and hazardous facilities to 
coexist in close proximity to each other with little regard for potential catastrophes that 
could ensue. It should be considered general knowledge that regulations should be in 
place to account for the implications of major accident hazards; however, how to 
implement and enforce new LUP regulation is still unknown [2]. 
 The assessments of case studies involving incidents with a clear lack of LUP are 
beneficial pieces of literature to study, learn, and prove that LUP is a poignant and 
ongoing issue. The full magnitude of the issue at hand and the potential impact that an 
effective LUP policy could have are seen in such case studies. Research attention to the 
assessment of current LUP policies throughout the world; evaluating the various 
approaches, methodologies and facets of each can lead to the root causes of the problem. 
Furthermore, characterizing the issue and identifying the questions that must be 
answered before implementation of an effective policy is plausible. Answering these 
questions is essential to implementing an effective LUP policy in the U.S. The study of 
past and current LUP policies throughout the European Union with the Seveso 
Directives, in addition to other countries that have existing LUP regulations has shown 
developments and progress as the world strives to identify a best practice. Learning from 
the modifications and results of other countries LUP policies will only benefit a policy 
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implemented in the U.S. Comparisons between approaches and countries has identified 
the key elements and issues that a LUP policy must address.  
 Lastly, analysis of current or lack of current U.S. policy regarding LUP is 
required. Finding the level or levels of government and/or parties of interest to include in 
the LUP decision-making process is unique to the U.S. and can only be done with 
analysis of the U.S. governmental system. Upon completion of identifying the aspects of 
a LUP best practice, combining these aspects into a policy that could work for the U.S. 
government is perhaps the biggest hurdle. Suggesting a policy that is flexible enough to 
work for all fifty states and all of their local communities, and requires sufficient 
backbone for enforcement and effectiveness will be the key contribution of this work.  
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3. CASE STUDIES 
 
The incidents briefly outlined below are heavily scrutinized in the history of the 
chemical industry and the dangerous operations associated with it. The chemical 
industry is relatively one of the safest industries, however incidents such as these are the 
reason for the negative connotation that many civilians associate with it. For example, 
the name Bhopal has become synonymous with industrial tragedy because of a toxic gas 
leak. The extensive destruction and devastation, in part due to poor LUP, of a few 
chemical incidents has become known worldwide. Although the chemical industry has 
one of the lowest incident rates among industries, its major incidents are often 
catastrophic, resulting in the negative association. Proper LUP, in the Bhopal case and 
other cases, could have prevented or greatly minimized the impact to the local 
communities that were sustained. The name Bhopal and the communities in which each 
of these other incidents occurred will forever be stained by these tragedies and the 
catastrophic effects. It is up to communities and governments around the world to 
prevent the calamitous effects of future chemical industrial incidents with the assistance 
of adequate LUP.  
 
3.1 GAS LEAK IN BHOPAL, INDIA 
 
During the early hours of December 3, 1984, more than 40 tons of toxic methyl 
isocyanate gas leaked from the Union Carbide Corporation’s (UCC) chemical plant in 
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Bhopal, India and swept through the uninformed surrounding population of almost a 
million people. Around 1:00 A.M. the pressure, built up within one of the storage tanks, 
at the plant gave way due to the exothermic reaction between water and the pesticide 
chemical formulation intermediate methyl isocyanate (MIC), which resulted in the 
release of a large plume of toxic gas. Within the following hours crisis ensued as 
humans, livestock and pets perished on the streets of Bhopal. Local hospitals and clinics 
overflowed with injured victims while the turmoil was further compounded by a lack of 
knowledge of plant operations and the nature and effects of the toxic gas that had swept 
through the city. The short and long-term effects of the disaster remain unmatched as the 
gas leak immediately killed at least 3,700 while exposing over 500,000 more. Some 
estimates on the number of fatalities are as high as 10,000 with as many as 20,000 more 
premature deaths reported due to the health effects of the toxic gas release over the 
following two decades [3]. The lasting effects of the gas and the disregard for process 
safety at the UCC pesticide plant shadow the name Bhopal and the chemical industry. 
The number of LUP and process safety factors contributing to the incident is alarming, 
and has served as a costly incident for lessons learned. 
UCC had been sought after to build a plant in India, for pesticide production, in 
an effort by the Indian government to encourage foreign company investments in local 
industry in the 1970s.  The location for the plant had been chosen in Bhopal for its 
centralized location and ease of access to existing transport infrastructure within the 
country. The precise location of the plant within the city had been reserved for light 
industrial and commercial use, but at the time of the incident the plant was far from 
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being classified as light industrial and commercial use [4]. Originally, the plant was to 
import the hazardous MIC in small quantities, but for economic reasons, the plant 
adopted the complete process of the pesticide formulation within the facility. The new 
operations exponentially increased the hazards within the plant and the risk to the 
surrounding community [5]. The process modifications made to the plant brought about 
increased risk at the justification of saving money. Three key safety systems were either 
not in use, not properly designed, or turned off on the morning of the incident. The 
refrigeration system, originally designed to cool the storage tanks in the case of a run-a-
way reaction, was shut down two years earlier and had since had its Freon removed to be 
used at another facility. The flare tower at the plant, used to burn off the MIC, had had a 
connection pipe removed and was therefore useless. A vent gas scrubber was also turned 
off on the morning of the incident. Both the vent gas scrubber and the flare tower were 
insufficiently designed to handle the magnitude of the leak produced on December 3 
1984.    
The relation of Bhopal to LUP is ubiquitous. Process safety deficiencies at the 
UCC plant led to the incident, but the clear lack of LUP and community awareness 
resulted in the magnitude of the incident. The shantytowns surrounding the plant and the 
population of Bhopal increased and encroached closer to the plant through the years as it 
provided jobs to the community, a problem that could have been mitigated with LUP. 
Additionally, the specific site for the plant was not zoned to allow hazardous operations, 
yet UCC was allowed to build and modify their plant to become a facility with a 
hazardous process and storage of a highly toxic intermediate. Lastly, there is the issue of 
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the community not being aware of the potential of a gas leak and not knowing how to 
respond. Hospitals did not know what to treat or how to treat an exposure from the plant.  
The utilization of a LUP policy could have significantly reduced the number of 
fatalities and those exposed to the toxic gas by limiting or preventing communities to 
grow next to the plant or vice versa. The absence of LUP use in India and UCC at the 
time dramatically changed the chemical process safety industry. The events in Bhopal 
exposed that expanding industrialization without simultaneous advancements in safety 
regulations can have catastrophic consequences [6].  
 
3.2 AZF FERTILIZER FACTORY, FRANCE 
 
On September 21, 2001, nearly 400 tons of off-specification ammonium nitrate 
(AN) exploded crippling the city of Toulouse, France. Located within the city, the AZF 
(Azote de France) fertilizer factory exploded with the power of 20-40 tons of TNT, 
leaving a 65 m x 54 m x 7 m crater [7]. The AN explosion killed 31, injured up to 
10,000, caused nearly 3 billion dollars in damage and resulted in new legislation for 
LUP. The tragic incident exposed the deficiencies of risk management, forcibility to 
remove inhabitants living in close proximity to hazardous facilities, lack of 
communication with communities, and urban pressure causing encroachment of 
inhabitants to the hazardous facilities in their current LUP policy.  
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The economic and urban environment of Toulouse, France grew greatly over the 
decade preceding the explosion, as the two struggled to find a balance in LUP. Dating 
back to the 1800s, in France, there is evidence of LUP and the realization that risks are 
prevalent to communities because of hazardous facilities located nearby. Explosions in 
1781, 1816 and 1840 caused nine deaths and damage to the surrounding areas and 
pressured the city council to take action regarding the cities’ LUP [8]. As a result, the 
industrial sector of the city was moved to the outskirts of town as the urban area 
continued to expand.  The urban population grew exponentially over the years following 
World War I and World War II as the manufacturing and chemical industry, within the 
city, provided economic growth and jobs. The urban development overtook the areas 
surrounding the hazardous sites despite a warning from the Director of the explosive 
factory [8]. The city was well aware of the hazards, and better LUP should have been 
taken into account. Unfortunately, there was a lack of action due primarily to the fact 
that urban development took precedence over safety.  The years preceding the AN  
explosion contained discussion regarding safety distances, urban development, safety 
studies, and potential plans of action. However, the rapid pressurization for urban 
development from their current urban situation attributed to unsuitable application of 
strict LUP around the hazardous facilities [8]. A case for positive use of LUP can be 
made between 1989 and 2001 in Toulouse, even though more could have been done. The 
PIG (Plan d’Intérêt Général) perimeter, which is based on the distance of a lethal 
concentration for 50% of people exposed, was calculated for the AZF fertilizer factory. 
Within the PIG perimeter, developmental restrictions were set that prevented further 
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urban development in the years following 1989. However, the development of the PIG 
perimeter and non-authorized housing developments in the years preceding the 
explosion in 2001 only made a slight difference considering that the LUP had no force to 
remove or mitigate the risk for developments established prior to 1989 [8]. 
The AN explosion in Toulouse is a good case of insufficient LUP. The explosion 
that riddled through the city shattered windows, doors and shops and left over 500 
houses uninhabitable [9]. The destruction to the community was vast even with their 
LUP efforts. The city was well aware of the potential consequences in relation to 
inadequate LUP and attempted to mitigate this risk. There had been discussion and 
limited action to mitigate the risk to the areas surrounding the AZF fertilizer factory, 
nevertheless; significantly, more action was needed to protect the community and its 
victims.  
 
3.3 EXPLOSION IN WEST, TEXAS 
 
 The West Fertilizer Company (WFC) located in West, Texas was the home of an 
ammonium nitrate (AN) explosion on April 17, 2013. The blast killed 15 and injured up 
to 300 more. It destroyed personal homes, an apartment complex, a nursing home and 
multiple schools located within the explosion radius of the blast. This incident 
highlighted the lack of effective LUP practice in the U.S. and should serve as a learning 
lesson for future LUP policy and implementation. Questions concerning the regulation 
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of LUP in the U.S. have been raised since the incident, yet little progress has been made 
in any type of action or legislation.  
 The WFC was founded in 1962 as a chemical supplier to farmers. When the 
facility was first founded in 1962, it was safely on the outskirts of town. At the time, the 
city of West also lacked zoning regulations, although such regulations would have been 
of little help giving that the WFC was located outside the city limits [10, 11]. For years, 
the community experienced substantial growth and expansion, growing within 
dangerous proximity of the ammonium nitrate storage facility, so much so that the 
community hardly realized the hazard they were approaching. The fact that the WFC did 
not manufacture chemicals but was rather only a large storage site; it was not seen as a 
major risk to the community. In 1985, a little more than 20 years after the WFC was 
built, the West Independent School District (WISD) built an intermediate school only 
552 feet from the WFC [10]. A few years later in 2000, the WISD constructed a second 
school within the blast radius of the facility. In all, the WISD had four schools that were 
damaged by the explosion, two existing prior to completion of the WFC and the closest 
two schools built after the opening of the WFC as seen in Table 1. Private residences 
were also permitted within the blast radius of the explosion calling for additional 
destruction to the community. Additional absence of LUP is visible in the construction 
of a nursing home and apartment complex in close proximity to the WFC after the WFC 
had already been in business for several years.  
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Table 1 - West Land Developments around WFC [10] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the evening of the explosion a fire broke out around 7:29 p.m. within the 
storage facility causing an explosion with the energy equivalent of approximately 12.5 
tons of TNT [12]. Approximately 22 minutes later a large explosion riddled through the 
city as the stored AN exploded and took the lives of 15, including 12 first responders 
whom were responding to the initial fire [12, 13]. The lack of community awareness and 
preparedness for such an event at the WFC in addition to the lack of information 
regarding the stored materials, quantifies and associated hazards attributed to the loss of 
the 12 first responders. Even more troubling is that in May of 2016 the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ruled the initial fire at the WFC was 
intentionally set [13].  
Consequences of the explosion still exist in the city of West today. Of the 700 
houses located in the city, half of them were impacted by the incident; the explosion also 
completely destroyed the nursing home and apartment complex [10]. However, the city 
Structure Year Constructed 
Distance to Explosion 
Center (feet) 
WFC 1962 ------ 
West Middle School 1923 2,000 
West Elementary School early 1960s - 1966 4,867 
West Independent School 1985 552 
West High School 2000 1,157 
West Rest Haven Nursing Home 1967 629 
West Terrace Apartment Complex 1979 454 
Park/basketball court N/A 249 
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was very fortunate with the timing of the explosion. Luckily, the explosion occurred in 
the evening when there were no students or faculty present at the schools. The WISD 
suffered extensive damage to the intermediate school, high school and middle school and 
minor damage to the elementary school. Two schools and the majority of a third ended 
up being demolished due to the irreparable damage sustained by the explosion [10]. The 
consequences of the incident would have been noted as much worse had the explosion 
occurred while school was in session. 
The explosion in West, Texas will leave an everlasting mark on the community, 
the State of Texas and the U.S. It serves as a perfect example of the severe consequences 
that can ensue with insufficient or simply a lack of LUP. 
 
3.4 EXPLOSION IN TIANJIN, CHINA 
 
 Ruihai International Logistics Co., Ltd. was a hazardous material warehouse 
located in the northeastern port city of Tianjin, China. The deadly combination of 
illegally storing large quantities of hazardous materials, corruption, inadequate LUP and 
management deficiencies resulted in multiple explosions, casualties and massive 
amounts of destruction.  
 Shortly before 11:00 pm on the night of August 12, 2015, Tianjin firefighters 
received word of a small fire inside the storage facility. As they arrived on site around 
11:10 pm, the fire had expanded to several large storage containers. The firefighter’s 
ability to fight the fire was severely hampered by stacked storage containers limiting 
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their access to the fire. Some containers were illegally stacked up to five high. At 11:30 
pm the first explosion occurred, followed by a larger second blast about 30 seconds later. 
Fires and small explosions continued for almost two days following the initial 
explosions. It is estimated that 800 tons of ammonium nitrate was responsible for the 
second blast that had an estimated equivalent energy of 430 tons of TNT [14].  
One hundred and sixty five people, mostly first responders, lost their lives in the 
tragic explosions and another 233 were admitted to the hospital [15, 16]. The blast was 
lethal out to 300-meters and created a shock wave that damaged the windows of 17,000 
households [16]. The full extent of the destruction is displayed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 - Tianjin Explosion Incident Losses [14] 
Loss Categories No. 
Deaths 165 
Injuries 798 
Destroyed buildings 304 
Destroyed vehicles 12,428 
Destroyed containers 7,533 
Total direct economic losses 6.866 (Billion yuan) about 1 billion 
American dollars 
 
 
Contributing factors to the incident include illegal storage quantities of hazardous 
materials, improper storage of flammable substances next to explosive substances, 
unsafe handling procedures and inadequate LUP. City officials were aware that the 
warehouse was not in compliance with safety distances, yet they approved its operations 
anyways [16]. A clear disregard for LUP and public safety on the part of the city 
officials. Thankfully, the explosion occurred late at night when neighboring businesses 
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were closed. Otherwise, the consequences of the incident could have been much worse. 
China has vowed to punish an excess of 100 officials that were involved in the illegal 
storage of hazardous materials. Following the incident, China has been working towards 
refining their LUP and ensuring that governmental and chemical industry officials are 
held accountable. Phasing-out and expropriation have been discussed as possible options 
to mitigate future LUP risks.  
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4. PROCESS OF APPLYING LUP 
 
The diverse environments in which LUP is applied in has resulted in various 
LUP policies. Countries have implemented polices that are best for their economic, 
structural, technical and political environments.  Nevertheless, the process of applying 
LUP can be broken down into three main steps:  
1. Scenario identification and assessment method 
2. Defining acceptable criteria 
3. Zoning & Risk Reduction Techniques 
In order for adequate LUP to be applied, there must first be proper scenario 
identification and corresponding assessments. Implementing LUP to less than worst-case 
scenarios can lead to inadequate planning and protection to the area surrounding a 
hazardous facility. In addition to policies regarding the selection of credible and 
conceivable scenarios, LUP shall also address the method of choice for evaluations. 
Whether using consequence or risk assessments to inform the LUP decision-making 
process, the preferred method process should be detailed in the regulations. The second 
step of applying LUP is defining acceptable criteria for threshold values, separation 
distances, consequences and risk levels. These criteria can be defined in regulations or 
provided in the form of suggested values in guidelines. The latter is used for a more 
decentralized approach, leaving the decision up to local authorities, planning agencies, 
or states. The final step of LUP is applying risk reduction techniques and zoning 
requirements. Risk reduction can be in the form of increased community awareness and 
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preparedness, emergency planning, inherently safer design, safety precautions and 
measures on site. These techniques are applied to various extents by the different 
countries. For example, some focus heavily on inherently safer design at hazardous 
facilities, seeking to employ the state of the art safety technology irrelevant of cost, 
while other countries employ a cost-benefit approach to the use of safety technology. 
Within zoning, LUP regulations can include the number of zones, developmental 
restrictions for each zone, permitting procedures, phasing-out and expropriation.  Step 3 
in the process of applying LUP is the action taken in response to LUP situations. 
Whether it is using risk reduction techniques or zoning requirements the effectiveness of 
the actions is largely responsible for the level of success of LUP. Approaches, 
methodologies and acceptable criteria differ between countries but they all aim to 
mitigate the effects to the areas surrounding hazardous facilities. Insignificant 
differences have been found between the uses of the various approaches and 
methodologies, pointing to the critical step of LUP being step 3.  
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5. THE LIMITATIONS OF LUP 
 
 There are numerous factors and questions that must be addressed before an 
effective LUP policy can be implemented in the United States. LUP is a significantly 
more complex issue than it appears on the surface.  The assortment of situations in 
which LUP is applied makes a single solution or even a series of simple solutions 
impractical. The practicality of placing a buffer zone around every hazardous facility is 
currently illogical. In addition, a best practice for implementing and enforcing LUP is 
exclusive to each country due to the distinct economic, political, developmental, and 
governmental climates of each.  
Separation zones are established with varying distances from the location of the 
hazardous facility as an implementation of LUP restrictions.  Within each approach and 
each country, threshold level values (TLVs) or risk criteria are established to distinguish 
between hazardous separations zones such as first deaths, first irreversible effects, minor 
injuries, etc. France, for example, sets up two separate zones surrounding hazardous 
facilities; the first is the distance in which the first occurrence of death is likely to 
appear, the larger second zone is at the onset of an irreversible effects to a citizen. 
Within the first zone, urban developments of sensitive inhabitants are prohibited such as 
hospitals, schools and nursing homes. Within the outer zone, urban developments that 
significantly increase the population or residential housing are prohibited. The criteria 
for the zones used, the number of zones, the land use restrictions within each zone and 
the criteria to establish them varies by methodology, approach and country. The 
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application of the separation distances for LUP is generally the same for all three 
approaches; the difference arises in the means used to arrive at the separation distances. 
Defining separation zones is a significant portion of LUP, but proving the effectiveness 
and enforcing them is the challenge. What is safe enough and how can it be verified? 
Are the separation distances large enough to prevent fatalities, yet small enough that 
they are enforceable and do not embargo large amounts of valuable land within cities.  
The solution to LUP in the United States will have to be flexible and thorough, 
establish minimum safe operation distances and account for both growth of facility and a 
community around it. Interest of different levels and departments of government, 
agencies, developers, landowners, local residents and other members of the public all 
have part in LUP and should be considered in the decision making process. Decisions at 
the local level are employment opportunities, benefits to the community from the 
operations of the facility, and future growth of the city [17]. A new or expanding facility 
within a community can bring about economic profitability, but depending on its 
location, at what cost to risk? Listed below are the questions that should be considered to 
create successful implementation of LUP: 
 If LUP is community driven, how can it incorporate big government or have a 
federal regulation and make it work? 
 What is everything that needs to be included for an effective LUP policy? 
 What level of government should oversee the issue? 
 How to address existing facilities within communities? 
 How to handle future growth around a facility? 
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 What is safe enough? Level of acceptable risk [17]? 
 How can the safety distances be verified? 
 What methodology/approach to use? 
The answers to these questions are complicated by the interest of the various 
groups that could be impacted by a LUP policy or decision. What one community or 
state prefers may not work for their neighbors. Flexibility will have to be incorporated 
into a LUP policy to account for the different economic, structural, political, technical, 
and other differences between states and even communities within states [18].  Every 
situation is different, and while no two solutions will be the same, it is clear that 
something must be implemented. Accidents will happen, and incidents will occur; the 
catastrophic consequences of them destroying communities and taking lives are 
unacceptable and should be addressed. Answering these questions thoroughly is the first 
step in the process of implementing a LUP policy in the U.S. 
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6. THREE APPROACHES TO LUP 
 
 Three main approaches to LUP have been established: generic safety distances 
(GSD), a consequence based approach (CBA) and a risk based approach (RBA).  All 
three approaches are currently in use to at least some degree. The extent that each is 
being used has changed with time and advancements in the industry and LUP. Each 
approach presents its own set of pros and cons, and each country is to pick what works 
best for them. Some countries that implemented a LUP policy have since adapted the 
original approach in response to an incident, changes in industry, or advancements in 
risk analysis. Some have even changed approaches completely in response to incidents, 
changes in industry, or changes in the landscape of the country all in an effort to 
continually improve their LUP policy. Other countries have implemented a combination 
of two approaches or have at least taken parts of one approach to incorporate into their 
LUP policy. Advancements in industry and risk management/calculation affect the 
effectiveness of each particular approach, and changes are required to keep up with best 
practices. Although these three approaches are significantly different in their 
methodologies, they all aim to mitigate the risk to communities by the use of LUP.     
   
6.1 GENERIC SAFETY DISTANCES APPROACH (GSD) 
 
 The generic safety distances approach, the simplest of the three, does not take 
into accounts the consequences or risks of major hazards. Instead, safety distances are 
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based on the hazardous substances present, their quantities and the nature of the facility 
operations [18]. The pros and cons of this approach are summarized in Table 3.  
The main benefit of this approach is the simplicity, resulting in a quick, time 
saving methodology to apply LUP. With safety distances determined based on effects 
and not on risk or consequences, less analyses and calculations are required, saving time 
and resources. Another benefit of this simplistic approach is the elimination of the 
uncertain variable of frequency and corresponding variance in assessed risk. There is 
great difficulty in assigning and calculating the probabilities of high consequence, low 
probability events that have led to LUP catastrophes. The large uncertainties in risk 
analysis regarding such events can greatly affect the results of LUP and lead to 
inefficient or ill-advised land use. As industry and risk analysis advances our ability to 
accurately define risk levels within the chemical industry, it will give more credibility to 
a risk based LUP policy. For now, though, this is an advantage of the generic safety 
distances approach.  
The GSD approach seeks to ensure essentially zero harm to the community, 
however, this leads to large areas of land being embargoed, an obvious con for urban 
development and economics of the community [19]. Additionally, the generalized nature 
of this approach does not take into account safety measures, safety features designed into 
the facility or the specifics of the facility operations. Therefore, a facility with very poor 
safety conditions, features and design can have the same safety distances as a new 
facility with the most modern safety designs, conditions and a significantly lower 
potential for an incident. This can lead to a greater area of land being embargoed than 
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necessary with a safe, modern facility or less land being embargoed surrounding a high-
risk facility due to poor safety conditions.  
 
Table 3 - Pros & Cons of GSD Approach 
Generic Safety Distances 
Pros Cons 
Simplest approach 
Significant areas of land can be 
embargoed [19] 
Does not include the uncertain 
variable of frequency or large 
variance in calculated risk 
Safety characteristics, measures & 
particulates of the facility are not 
accounted for [18] 
Goal of zero harm to community No account for scenario likelihood 
 
 
Industry is continually learning and gathering more information regarding the 
probabilities of high risk, low probability incidents that have caused catastrophic 
incidents. As industries’ knowledge advances, the generic safety distances approach 
becomes less ideal for communities looking to maximize the economic availability of 
the lands surrounding hazardous facilities. Fortunately, this approach is certainly better 
than nothing is and has been a positive starting point for several countries.  
 
6.2 CONSEQUENCES BASED APPROACH (CBA) 
 
 In the consequences based approach (CBA) only the severity of an incident is 
accounted for, the likelihood of occurrence and corresponding risk calculation are 
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ignored for LUP purposes. The CBA is similar to a worst-case scenario analysis in that 
the consequences of one scenario or incident are taken into account for defining the 
separation distances. The belief is that the separation distances of a worst-case scenario 
will sufficiently protect against all other less than worst-case scenarios. Some countries 
utilize a list of reference scenarios that are based on past incidents or foreseeable 
consequences of facilities in order to determine the worst-case scenario that will be used. 
A con of the CBA is that it is often difficult to identify the worst conceivable scenario 
[18, 19]. Improper determination of the worst-case scenario can lead to improper land 
use and inappropriate allotment of risk exposure to the surrounding community.  
Table 4 summarizes the pros and cons of the approach.  
  Much like the GSD approach, the CBA does not use a risk variable in its 
calculation of separation distances, eliminating the uncertain variable of frequency and 
large variance in calculated risk [19]. While this is a positive of the approach in itself, it 
may consequently lead to a larger area of land being embargoed than desired. Another 
unfavorable characteristic is the challenge of establishing opportune threshold levels for 
undesired effects and industries [19]. As mentioned previously with the calculation of 
risk, uncertainty and large variance is a characteristic in evaluation of hazardous 
facilities and industries. The low probability incidents and limited historical data limit 
the validation of risk calculations, separation zones and threshold levels.  
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Table 4 - Pros & Cons of CBA Approach 
Consequence Based Approach 
Pros Cons 
Less time consuming than risk based 
approach 
Tends toward significant areas of land 
being embargoed 
Does not include the uncertain 
variable of frequency or large 
variance in calculated risk 
Difficult to determine suitable threshold 
levels for risk effects 
  No account for scenario likelihood 
  
Can be difficult to determine worst case 
scenario 
  
 
In terms of time, money and complexity, the CBA falls in the middle of the three 
approaches. It is more time consuming, expensive and complex than the GSD, but less 
than the risk based approach (RBA). The key attributes of the approach include the worst 
case scenario is used, threshold values are set for undesired effects and the likelihood of 
incidents is not accounted for. Some countries have shifted to utilize more of a CBA, as 
others have shifted away from the CBA. An argument can be made for the effectiveness 
of this approach and it is perhaps the most widely utilized approach.  
 
6.3 RISK BASED APPROACH (RBA) 
 
The intention of the risk-based approach (RBA) is to incorporate the 
consequences of a potential incident and the frequency or likelihood of that event. The 
methods used are believed to be more complete and comprehensive because of the 
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incorporation of the variable of frequency; after all, risk is equal to frequency multiplied 
by the consequences. Some believe that incorporation of risk into the calculations for 
LUP makes it the most extensive method justified for the major incidents evaluated for 
LUP [19]. However, this is also the major drawback of this approach. The primary 
objection for the RBA has been the inclusion of frequency and its corresponding 
uncertainty related to low probability, high consequence incidents. The two approaches 
mentioned previously do not include the large uncertainty of a frequency variable, and 
consequently, have no frequency variable listed as a positive aspect of the approaches. 
Therefore, inclusion of frequency in LUP is both a positive and a negative attribute 
dependent upon the LUP approach. As advancements are made in risk calculations and 
the accuracy for the likelihood for low probability, high consequence events in the 
chemical industry increases, the more positive inclusion of a frequency variable becomes 
for LUP purposes. Table 5 summarizes the pros and cons of this approach.   
A third positive of this approach is the ability to measure individual and societal 
risk to incorporate them into the risk zones [19]. Individual risk is the annual risk of 
death or serious injury defined by the probability as a result of an incident, and societal 
risk is often referred to as the relationship between frequency and consequences 
expressed on an F-N curve [20]. This approach generally incorporates three risk regions 
(unacceptable, affordable, and acceptable) into the LUP evaluations.  Each region should 
have clearly defined criteria levels, mitigation and appropriate actions to take. 
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Table 5 - Pros & Cons of RBA Approach 
 Risk Based Approach 
Pros Cons 
Most comprehensive method 
Uncertainty related to the frequency of 
low probability, high consequence 
events 
Individual and societal risk are 
accounted for 
More time consuming, complicated and 
expensive than other two approaches 
Accounts for frequency of events   
 
 
Arguments can be made for or against any of the three approaches, but the RBA 
garners the most discussion. There is considerable speculation concerning the 
incorporation of a frequency variable. The challenge of accurately assigning frequency 
values to low probability, high consequence events significantly affects the risk levels 
and LUP regulations. On one hand, it makes the calculations more comprehensive and 
justified for major accident hazards and, on the other hand, it adds a larger value of 
uncertainty.   
  
6.4 APPROACH IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The descriptions and tables above show that positive attributes for one approach 
are often negative attributes for one or both of the other approaches. This is certainly the 
case with the variable of frequency; it can be a negative aspect due to its uncertainty or a 
positive aspect for its all-inclusive nature. As industry continues to advance in risk based 
analysis methods, the RBA will become more and more effective. These raises the 
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questions of when improvements in risk analysis will become adequate, and how can it 
be proven adequate. Regardless, LUP is dynamic and the RBA will not be the best 
practice for every country.  
The strict interpretation of each approach was discussed above; furthermore, 
implementation of a single approach can be limiting to its applicability, especially in a 
highly developed country like the U.S. were land is at a premium. In industry and 
throughout the world it is more common to see implementation of multiple approaches 
or adaptation of two approaches by a single country to best fit their economic, political, 
structural and governmental climate as seen in    Table 6. There is flexibility and 
numerous methodologies that can be used to obtain similar results with each approach 
and an argument can be made for each approach as best practice depending on the 
situation. A comparison of the effectiveness of LUP policies between countries is almost 
impossible considering the rarity of incidents and the numerous methodologies used to 
obtain separation distances. With so many factors, components, circumstances and 
different interest groups every LUP policy is expected to be different. The separation 
distances calculated with one policy will certainly differ from another but the critical 
aspect of the policy will be in the mitigation, handling and enforcement of the separation 
distances. Therefore, the effectiveness of a policy enacted in the U.S. will notably rely 
upon its ability to flexibly and effectively mitigate risk to the community.  
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   Table 6 - Overview of Current LUP Approaches (Adapted from [21]) 
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7. EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 
 The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union between 28 
European countries referred to as the Member States. Initially created in 1958, to 
promote economic cooperation, it has grown to incorporate much more. Legislation 
promulgated by the EU is the equivalent of a national law; it is the responsibility of the 
Member States to implement EU legislation into a national law and adequately enforce 
it. The Seveso Directives are a series of three directives and an amendment that combine 
to form the main EU legislation for regulating the control of major accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances as seen in Figure 1. Seveso I Directive (82/501/EEC) 
was enacted in 1982 to promulgate the requirements for emergency planning, informing 
the public, and the requirement of operators and owners to maintain a list of hazardous 
substances. Seveso I is very similar to the United States Emergency Planning and Right 
to Know Act of 1986. Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) addresses major accident 
prevention and separation distances, similar to the United States Clear Air Amendments 
Act of 1990. In 2003, the EU enacted an amendment to Seveso II that created a working 
group to increase uniformity among the Member States for implementation of major 
accident planning and separation distances [22]. This working group set up by the EU 
provides guidance to the LUP authorities of each of the Member States and runs the 
incident database for the EU. The amendment also requires owners and operators to 
verify that offsite risk is acceptable, adding emphasis to proper LUP. Most recently, in 
2012, the EU implemented Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU). Seveso III strengthened 
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LUP policy by placing additional emphasis on emergency planning, providing 
information to the public, strengthening inspection requirements, and incorporating the 
Globally Harmonized System(GHS) of substance classification [22].  
 
 
Figure 1 - EU Seveso Directives 
 
 
 The Seveso Directives set out by the EU require the Member States to implement 
a LUP policy but do not specify the methodology or approach to be used. They require 
that a LUP policy addresses the aspects of establishing and maintaining adequate 
separation distances, the need of additional safety measures in existing facilities and 
preventing major incidents by mitigating the consequences for the siting of new, 
existing, as well as the modification of existing facilities [17]. At the national level: 
criteria are defined for the level of acceptable consequences or risk with separation 
distances, restrictions are set for developments within those separation distances, and 
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guidance is promulgated for future LUP if those conditions are not met. The local level, 
however, often has the decision-making rights in the LUP decision-making process.   
 34 
 
8. GERMANY 
 
Germany has taken a decentralized approach to LUP regulations with their 
system of national, state and local governments. The national and state governments 
provide the framework for LUP policy while local governments establish land use plans. 
At the national level, the Spatial Planning Act provides guidance for the planning 
process and defines the basic principles for LUP in Germany [22, 23]. In accordance 
with the requirements of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive, the methods of LUP are 
defined in the pollution protection law as well as the urban planning law [24]. Additional 
regulations at the national level include the Federal Building Code (BauGB) and the 
Federal Land Use Ordinance (BauNVO), which together recognize the use of 
appropriate separation distances to minimize the effects of major incidents. Regulations 
not directly addressed in the regulations above are decentralized to the states and local 
levels of government. The criteria for acceptable safety distances/consequences are 
determined by each individual state; yet, the local levels of government have the ability 
to implement their own.  
Germany has taken a different perspective on the approach and methodology 
used for LUP than most other countries. Germans have placed a significant emphasis on 
utilizing state of the art safety technology in an effort to minimize the effects of an 
incident. No reference to cost-benefit is made in the application of safety measures to 
minimize the effects of an incident. Safety measures and technology on site are a priority 
for the operations of hazardous chemical facilities, and the extent of their 
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implementation are taken into account in the LUP process. Germany is also one of the 
few countries who use GSD for LUP. GSD based upon historical data and expert 
judgment from operating experience has historically been used. Noteworthy, Germany 
has transitioned to a combination of GSD and a CBA based upon the presence of 
noxious characteristics [18]. Generic safety distances are used when a facility does not 
require a detailed hazard assessment due to lack of noxious characteristics or in the case 
of existing operations involving explosives and fertilizers (AN). In these cases, 
separation distances are applied based upon the substance present and its quantity. For 
new developments near existing hazardous facilities (a case – by – case basis) or for the 
presence of noxious characteristics (worst conceivable scenario) a consequence-based 
approach is utilized. In the presence of noxious characteristics, separation distances are 
distributed amongst four classes, as displayed in Figure 2, based upon quantity and end-
point determination for thermal radiation, explosive overpressures and toxic 
concentration [24]. Guidance for recommended separation distances were originally 
defined in the guidance document “SFK/TAA-GS-1”, but have recently been updated in 
“KAS-18.K” [25]. Germany has been reluctant to use QRA for LUP due to the 
uncertainty of probabilities assigned to major incidents in the industry and the resultant 
variance in the results of a QRA. 
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Figure 2 - Generic Safety Distances in Germany [25] 
 
 
 The goal of LUP in Germany is for no serious hazard to reach the public 
population surrounding the hazardous facility with emphasis placed on the application of 
state of the art safety technology. Recommended safety distances seek to prevent no 
harm to the public, but they are only recommendations and not mandatory to be applied 
by the local governments in charge of LUP. Germany is a good example of required 
flexibility and reluctance to apply risk assessments in the application of LUP. By 
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utilizing GSD and a CBA, they have simplified the application of LUP and have made 
the competent authority the party with the most interest, the local government.  
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9. FRANCE 
 
 In 2001, an explosion of ammonium nitrate stored at a fertilizer factory in 
Toulouse, France occurred. Unfortunately, for France and the community of Toulouse, 
urban development had taken precedence over safety and proper LUP. The impact of the 
explosion in conjunction with devastating flooding the following year sparked new 
regulations and advancements in LUP and risk analysis.  
 Prior to 2003, France solely used a CBA for the evaluation of LUP based upon 
the identification of the worst-case scenario without regard for incident probabilities. A 
list of reference scenarios such as fire, explosion, or BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding 
vapor explosion) were used to help identify the worst-case scenario. Owners/operators in 
agreement with authorities were required to evaluate the consequences of the various 
reference scenarios and demonstrate that adequate measures to minimize each ones 
consequences had been taken [18]. The list of reference scenarios was not all-inclusive; 
owners/operators had the ability to evaluate additional incident scenarios, and/or 
authorities could require additional scenarios to be evaluated. Upon completion of the 
consequence analyses on the required scenarios, the worst-case was further evaluated for 
LUP purposes. Threshold values were then utilized for the determination of the two 
circular danger zones that France LUP requires. 
 After 2003, France called for the investigation and assessment of probabilities for 
all possible scenarios [9]. By incorporating a probability assessment, thereby making it a 
RBA, they felt as though it would be a better representation of potential incidents. 
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However, France did not switch completely to a RBA. The new regulation allows for the 
use of probability assessments to help inform the decision-making process and to better 
prepare for potential incidents, yet, LUP zones are still primarily based on the 
consequences of an incident. The new regulation aims to improve three critical areas of 
LUP [9]: 
 Addition of probability assessment to complement existing analysis 
 Standardization of risk analysis procedures 
 Ability to take action to remove existing establishments and to control future 
growth surrounding hazardous facilities 
To accomplish these three goals, the new regulation created technological risk 
prevention plans (PPRT) to consider the types of risks, their gravity, and their 
probability. The basic goal in France was to harmonize risk analyses procedures and 
LUP evaluations.  
Tolerability criterion and LUP procedures in France follow a very systematic 
process and are well documented in the Code de l’Urbanisme. Article 110 within the 
code addresses the public’s health and safety in regards to LUP and states that 
prevention of industrial risks shall be taken into account in the local planning process. 
The French Ministry of the Environment has established a national matrix for risk 
acceptability based upon gravity and probability levels. Gravity is defined as a 
combination of the intensity of the effects and the number of people in the area and is 
divided into five levels as seen in Table 7 [9]. 
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Table 7 - Gravity Levels in France [9] 
 
 
Probability levels are also divided into five levels resulting in a 5 by 5 matrix 
used to determine the acceptability of risk surround hazardous facilities as seen in Table 
8. No new facilities, modification of existing facilities, or the construction of new 
establishments near existing facilities is allowed if a risk exists in the red/NO region. 
The NO/MMR2 region is also off-limits for the construction of a new facility. Proposals 
for new developments must not result in five or more risks within the orange/MMR2 
region of the risk matrix in order to be approved. The yellow/MMR1 region means that 
facilities must utilize risk reduction measures to be approved [9]. Furthermore, two 
zones or perimeters are established based upon risk levels. Within the outer zone, new 
establishments and modifications to existing ones can be prohibited and are evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis by the state representative at the local level in conjunction with the 
local authorities. Establishments within the inner zone are subject to expropriation [9, 
23].  
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Table 8 - France's National Risk Acceptability Matrix [9] 
 
 
The PPRT take the procedures a step farther in risk evaluations used for LUP 
decisions. The risks previously characterized in the national risk matrix are combined to 
give overall risk levels at each location surrounding a hazardous facility using Table 9. 
The result is a new map with zoning requirements that are evaluated by the state, 
regulatory bodies, operators, and locals before being approved as an outcome of the 
PPRT.  The restrictions are summarized in Table 10.          
 
Table 9 - France's Zoning Levels [23] 
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Table 10 - France's Zoning Principals [26] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - France's Risk Map [26] 
 
 
France is noted for its inclusive and refined LUP process; however, it has come 
at the cost of being time consuming and in response to the Toulouse incident. France felt 
that their previous regulations could be improved with a better-defined process and 
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additional flexibility incorporated into the analyses used for LUP purposes. The new 
regulation in 2003 did not attempt to change the main principles of the initial LUP 
regulation, but, it provides a more sound framework for LUP, which allows the 
incorporation of a RBA [27]. France reasoned that the addition of frequencies and risk 
analysis can take into account risk reduction measures better, leading to the evaluation of 
scenarios that are better than worst-case [28]. France improved their LUP by adding 
flexibility into their assessment methods, harmonizing the assessment approach and by 
addressing future growth and existing establishments surrounding hazardous facilities.  
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10. UNITED KINGDOM (UK) 
 
 The UK has a well-known safety institution in the Health & Safety Executive 
(HSE), which oversees the health and safety of the country by implementing and 
controlling a number of acts and regulations. In response to the Seveso Directives, the 
HSE is in charge of implementation of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act of 
1990, Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations of 1992 and Control of Major 
Accidents Hazards (COMAH). The HSE in combination with the Environmental Agency 
for England and Wales and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) form 
the competent authority for the enforcement of COMAH [22]. In 2005, their COMAH 
regulations were updated to put added emphasis on the availability of information to the 
public [29]. For implementation of LUP, the HSE has published guidelines for 
acceptable risk levels, decision making procedures and its LUP decision matrix to 
achieve their roles of advising local planning agencies (LPA) and offering advice on 
proposed new developments [30]. 
 The LUP process is initiated by the proposal for a new facility, modification of 
an existing facility or establishment within the separation distance of an existing facility. 
LPA receive the information for a proposal and pass it along to the HSE for consultation. 
The HSE evaluates the risk assessment and utilizes its Planning Advice for 
Developments near Hazardous Instillations (PADHI) system to set a consultation 
distance around the hazardous facility [22]. The area surrounding the facility, within the 
consultation distance, is broken down into three zones based on established risk criteria 
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as the first part of the decision matrix. The second part of the decision matrix is the 
sensitivity of the proposed development. The HSE has distinguished four levels of 
sensitivity to consider in the decision making process. Level 4 is for the most sensitive 
populations such as large schools or hospitals while level 1 is for the general working 
population. Depending on the sensitivity of the proposed development within the 
particular zone, the HSE will either advise against or does not advise against based on 
their matrix in Table 11. The LUP process is displayed in Figure 4 below.  
 
Table 11 - HSE's LUP Decision Matrix [19] 
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Figure 4 - UK LUP Process [19, 22] 
  
 
The UK utilizes a combination of a CBA and RBA for the evaluation of major 
incident hazards. The HSE has employed different approaches depending on the 
substance and scenario in question. In cases of thermal radiation and explosions a CBA 
is used, while in the case of toxic releases a RBA is used [19, 30]. For both cases, the 
HSE has promulgated specific guidelines and tools to be used. Furthermore, the HSE 
provides guidelines for the adoption of as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
principles to risk reduction measures.  
Although the UK and the HSE are strongly centralized in respect to health, safety 
and the LUP process, the final decision for permitting new developments is up to the 
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LPA. In extreme cases, when the LPA does not follow the advice of the HSE, the HSE 
can apply to take over the decision-making responsibilities of the LPA. Another 
noteworthy aspect of LUP in the UK is the dual approach dependent upon the substance 
and scenario in question. This enables built in flexibility to evaluations used for LUP 
purposes. 
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11. NETHERLANDS 
 
The substantial presence of oil and chemical industries in the relatively small 
country of the Netherlands led to the realization of the importance of LUP early on. 
Major implications of LUP in respect to hazardous facilities began because of public 
displeasure with industrial incidents occurring the 1960s. Public objection to industrial 
incidents led to the development of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) procedures. By 
the 1980s the Netherlands defined acceptable risk levels with the National 
Environmental Policy Plan [22]. The Spatial Planning Act and the Environmental 
Protection Act are the primary regulations regarding LUP in the country. They 
collectively address the process, procedures and the level of government that possess 
planning powers. In response to Seveso II Directive, the Dutch have implemented the 
Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) and the Dutch Public Safety Decree (BEVI) [30]. 
BEVI is pertinent to spatial decisions and planning for hazardous facilities and has 
increased the number of facilities that must perform QRAs.  
The various acts relating to the protection of the environment has driven the 
Dutch government to construct a new piece of environmental regulation that combines 
existing acts. The new environmental code was published in 2016 and goes into effect in 
2019 with the goal of increasing dialog between locals and government, simplifying the 
regulations into one for less clutter and standardizing the approach and decision making 
process [31].  
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Unlike the UK, the Netherlands has taken a more decentralized approach to their 
LUP policy. They have a multi-level system that includes the national, providential, and 
municipal levels. All three levels of government have separate planning powers 
depending on the facility in question. At the national level, the Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment Ministry (VROM) is the competent authority for the siting of 
facilities with a national interest, such as nuclear power plants. The providential level is 
the authority for facilities that fall under the top-tier Seveso classification, while the 
municipal level is in charge of lower-tier Seveso facilities. The competent governmental 
tier per facility is responsible for checking facility compliance with LUP and the validity 
of QRA analysis [30].  
Similar to the rest of the EU, they have established tolerability criteria, guidelines 
and procedures to be followed at the national level. The Dutch are noted for their 
distinction between individual (10
-6
 per year for new facilities and 10
-5
 per year for 
existing facilities) and societal risk criteria (10
-3
/N
2
 for new and existing). Risk of 10
-5
 
per year is tolerable for existing situations, but the goal is always 10
-6
 per year, adding 
flexibility to the planning process for existing LUP situations. Additionally, it allows the 
planning authority to take into account emergency notification and response when 
making decisions. Another distinct element of Dutch LUP is their use of risk maps. 
These are constructed using a national database as the source of information regarding 
probabilities and risk levels to facilities, and are used to inform the decision making 
process as well as the public.    
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The Netherlands is notable for its early and consistent implementation of a RBA 
to LUP. They require QRA with determination of end-points to create two LUP zones 
around hazardous facilities. In the area between the two separation distances, less 
sensitive establishments such as industrial complexes and recreational facilities are 
allowed. Within the outer zone, sensitive populations such as hospitals, schools and 
residential areas are prohibited. In the case of existing LUP situations, Dutch 
municipalities have the powers to expropriate. Although considered a last resort, the 
powers to expropriate in the Netherlands are relatively large compared to other countries 
for LUP purposes [32]. 
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12. CURRENT STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
The U.S. has been one of the leaders of industrial safety since the 1984 incident 
in Bhopal. There have been several laws and regulations passed with the unified goal of 
protecting employees and civilians against the hazards and risks created by hazardous 
chemical operations and facilities. However, developments have been slow and often 
implemented in response to major incidents. Many of the laws and regulations passed 
have touched on the subject, but none have directly addressed LUP as shown in Table 
12. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has 
published recommendations concerning siting requirements for liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) facilities, and the EPA has regulations concerning off-site consequences and 
calculation of separation distances. However, there is a lack of guidance for risk 
assessments and addressing conflicts between land uses in laws in the U.S. There are 
still many unanswered questions and issues to address in order for the U.S. to be able to 
implement a definitive LUP policy.  
 
Table 12 - Relevant U.S. LUP Regulations  
Agency LUP Relation CFR 
OSHA On-Site Siting 29 CFR Part 1910 
ATF Explosive materials 27 CFR Part 555 
DOT LNG Pipeline Facility Siting 49 CFR Part 193 
HUD Noise & Pollution Siting 
Requirements 
24 CFR Part 51 
EPA RMP 40 CFR Part 68 
Standards for Owners 40 CFR Part 264 
President Obama Executive Order 13650  
California Planning & Zoning law (2011)  
U.S. Constitution Fifth Amendment  
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12.1 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT OF 1986 
(EPCRA) 
 
The tragedy at Bhopal was the first landmark incident that had a profound impact 
on industrial safety throughout the world. It highlighted the lack of regulations 
worldwide that required hazardous facilities to communicate with local communities 
concerning the hazards, risks and emergency planning preparation in case of an 
emergency. Several countries responded with regulations emphasizing these holes, 
including one in the U.S. known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). Bhopal was the driving force Congress needed to address 
the clear lack of information on chemical hazards conveyed to the public. EPCRA has 
two main functions: (1) emergency notification and planning and (2) informing the 
public. The emergency planning portion of the act administers a framework to facilitate 
the dialog between hazardous facilities and local communities to set up emergency 
planning procedures. It also set up requirements for emergency notifications when an 
incident ensues. The community right-to-know portion of the act gave everyday citizens 
the rights to imperative information on the hazards and toxic chemicals present at 
industrial locations within their communities without requiring governmental mediation 
[33]. This act has been instrumental in providing the avenues for informing the public of 
hazardous chemicals within local communities; nonetheless, it is only the first step in 
protecting them.  
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12.2 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (CAAA) 
 
The next major advancement in U.S. safety regulations was the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 (CAAA). A critical part of its amendments were the requirements 
for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and for the EPA to enact a 
chemical process safety standard to prevent accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. 
Section 304 of the CAAA calls for the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, to promulgate a chemical process safety standard [34]. In 
response, the Process Safety Management (PSM) rule was enacted in a fourteen-part 
OSHA standard that requires employers to perform a workplace hazard assessment, 
develop and maintain written safety information, train and educate employees, etc. The 
standard has been prominent in advancing employee safety for highly hazardous 
chemical facilities. PSM even goes as far as addressing facility-siting issues for facilities 
handling highly hazardous chemicals; however, this requirement only applies to onsite 
consequences. OSHA and PSM have been irreplaceable in developing regulations and 
enforcement for the protection of employee safety. Yet, their contribution to LUP and 
consequences “outside the fence” are minimal.   
The more pertinent part of the CAAA to LUP noted in section 112(r) requires the 
EPA to establish guidelines for chemical accident prevention at facilities that use 
particular hazardous chemicals. This led directly to the enactment of 40 CFR Part 68, 
referred to as the Risk Management Plan rule. Part 68 is composed of the chemical 
accident prevention provisions and places the key requirements on employers to perform 
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a hazard assessment, which includes an off-site consequence analysis (OCA), 
submission of a risk management plan and list of regulated substances and quantities 
[22]. OCA parameters such as endpoint determination and worst-case release analysis 
parameters are promulgated in 40 CFR Part 68.22 (a-g) and displayed in Table 13. 
Owners and operators of hazardous chemical facilities must use this data outline in Part 
68.22 to determine distances to endpoints.    
 
Table 13 - Endpoints & Parameters for Worst-case Scenario Analysis [35] 
Endpoints Toxics Provided in appendix A of Part 68 
Explosion Overpressure of 1 psi 
Radiant heat/exposure time Radiant heat of 5 kw/m
2
 for 40 
seconds 
Lower flammability limit (LFL) As provided by NFPA 
Parameters Wind speed/atmospheric stability 
class 
Wind speed = 1.5m/sec 
F atmospheric stability class 
Ambient temperature/humidity Highest temperature in last 3 years 
& average humidity
1,2 
Height of release Assuming ground level (0 feet)
1 
Surface roughness Rural or urban, as appropriate 
Dense or neutrally buoyant gases Dispersion models shall 
appropriately account for gas 
density 
Temperature of released substance Process temperature or highest 
daily maximum temperature based 
on last 3 years, whichever is 
higher
1 
1
 Alternative scenario analysis has different criteria 
2
 Data must be gathered at the stationary source or at a local meteorological station 
 
 
The regulations also call for the owner or operator to identify and analyze 
alternative release scenarios for each regulated toxic substance held in a process and at 
least one alternative release scenario to represent all flammable substances held in 
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covered processes. Unlike the worst-case scenario analysis, the alternative scenario 
analysis is more likely to occur, therefore enhancing the ability to assign a more 
appropriate release height, temperate of released substance, and ambient 
temperature/humidity parameters. Enforcing the analysis of alternative scenarios is best 
for the owner, operator, and the local community. It provides more information 
regarding potential incident scenarios to the community and first responders while also 
covering more bases for the facility. 40 CFR Part 68.30 defines the criteria that the 
owner or operator shall use to define the offsite impacts in the RMP. The regulations call 
for an estimate of the population within the radius of the endpoint and examination of 
the presence of schools, hospitals, parks, major commercial areas, etc. This 
determination of impact to the surrounding population is essentially the second step in 
LUP, determining the consequences to the surrounding population. It also requires the 
owner or operator to review and update the OCA at least once every five years or if 
changes occur in the process, quantities stored or handled, or any other aspect that may 
change the calculated endpoint by a factor of 2.  
The EPA in respect to OSHA is much more pertinent concerning LUP. OSHA is 
mandated with employee safety, dealing with onsite hazards and risk, but the EPA works 
with affairs off-site. RMP is the closest piece of regulation that the U.S. has to mitigate 
the impacts of LUP. It provides a good basis and starting point for the future 
implementation of LUP in the U.S.  The EPA’s RMP, which includes OCA, is only a 
part of a possible future LUP policy that sets about the requirements for facilities to 
submit risk management plans and the methodology, parameters and approach to be used 
 56 
 
to calculate safety distances. Still missing is guidance or regulation on how to use 
separation distances with LUP, how to handle future growth, how to handle existing 
facilities with LUP issues and how to enforce LUP. RMP addresses the need to 
determine separation distances but provides no requirements for them. A facility may 
determine that a school, hospital or highly populated residential area is within the radius 
of their calculated separation distances, but has no requirement or guidance on a plan of 
action to mitigate that risk. RMP and EPCRA are valuable pieces of regulation that help 
to inform the public and community of the hazards and potential consequences, yet the 
heart of a LUP policy is still missing in the U.S. and is one that shall be solved.  
 
 12.3 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (ATF) 
 
The ATF has been given the authority to require separation distances for the 
storage of explosive materials to inhabited buildings, highways and railways [36]. In the 
CFR, the ATF has established three classes (high explosives, low explosives, or blasting 
agents) of explosive materials, and any material falling under the list of materials for 
either class shall be stored in compliance with the regulation. Separation distances are 
set based upon the class of the explosive material and the quantity of it stored. Section 
555.201 of the CFR requires any person storing explosive materials to notify the official 
in charge of fire safety for the locality in which the explosive materials are stored of the 
type and location. 
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Much like the EPA’s RMP, the ATF fails to provide guidance on LUP or actions 
to take in the event of a land use conflict. Although the ATF does a great job of defining 
separation distances for the storage of explosive materials, it is lacking regulations for 
governmental oversight, enforcement, and direction to counter LUP issues.  
 
12.4 PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER (EO) 13650 
 
 President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13650 “Improving Chemical 
Facility Safety and Security” on August 1, 2013 in response to tragic chemical facility 
incidents. The purpose of the EO was to enhance the safety and security of chemical 
facilities in an effort to minimize the risks present to communities, employees, operators 
and owners [37]. It set up a Federal working group of representatives from multiple 
agencies such as the EPA, DOT, OSHA and the DHS; pulling together subject matter 
experts in three areas relevant to LUP; modernizing policies and regulations, 
incorporating stakeholder feedback, developing best practices, and strengthening 
community planning and preparedness. These three components of the EO are, in many 
ways, the same aspects that are required for an effective LUP policy. Incorporating 
stakeholder feedback and developing best practices resembles the underlying goal of a 
LUP policy. Local communities are the driving force behind LUP, and the local 
stakeholders’ feedback is a crucial part of its success. Improving State and Local 
Emergency Response Commissions and expanding the tools that assist them in the 
decision-making process for chemical facilities can be highly beneficial to the 
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effectiveness and ability of local communities to make informed decisions regarding 
LUP.  
One of the future actions of the working group, in respect to modernizing 
policies and regulations, is modernizing EPA’s RMP regulation [38]. One way the EO 
hopes to achieve its goal of preventing chemical incidents is by updating RMP. This 
priority has led to proposed revisions to the accident prevention program requirements. 
The program requirements do not directly address LUP, but they could be forthcoming. 
The foundations of calculating separation distances and conducting an off-site 
consequence analysis are already promulgated in RMP. RMP is the closet regulation the 
U.S. has to a LUP policy, and building upon it to incorporate LUP is not out of the 
question. Perchance, modernization of the EPA’s RMP could result in an amendment 
addressing existing facilities within communities, the future growth around a facility, 
new proposals for chemical facilities and authorization of a level of government to 
oversee LUP.  
 
12.5 CALIFORNIA LUP 
 
California’s land use and planning law is a perfect example of the decentralized 
approach the U.S. has taken concerning LUP. The power to regulate private land use has 
been passed down from the federal government to the states, and, in turn, the states have 
passed it down to local communities. The California Constitution sets the premises that a 
county or city may set and enforce ordinances to protect the public health, safety and 
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welfare of its residents [39]. The broad power to enact such ordinances allows the 
distinct legislative bodies across the state to implement a policy that fits their needs, yet 
the dynamic and complex nature of LUP provides a challenge. Therefore, the burden of 
creating, implementing, and enforcing a LUP policy lies with the legislative bodies of 
the counties or cities, with minimal state or federal oversight.  
California Governmental Code Section 65100-65107 creates a local planning 
agency in each city and county with the powers necessary to carry out the purposes of 
LUP. The local planning agency is to be constructed of at least 5 members who all shall 
act in the public interest and report to the legislative body of each city or county [40]. 
Related to LUP, Article 2. Adoption of Regulations 65850 states the legislative body of 
any county or city may adopt ordinances that regulate the intensity of land use and the 
location, height, bulk, and size of buildings and structures. Essentially, it is granting 
local legislative bodies the power to set and enforce LUP policy as long as it complies 
with state and federal laws. Still, any type of guidance on how to achieve LUP goals is 
nonexistent. It is similar to EPA’s RMP in the way that owners or operators must 
perform hazardous material risk assessment and certify whether or not a proposed 
project will have more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process. 
How to use that information for LUP purposes is still missing in regulations [41]. 
Setting up local planning agencies is a step forward for the U.S.’s ability to 
effectively implement a LUP policy. The heart of LUP lies within local communities, so 
the creation of local planning agencies is forward progress in getting the right people 
involved in the decision making process. Establishing a specific agency to handle such 
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issues would be promising for LUP and the creation of a comprehensive LUP policy. 
Unfortunately, these are still far off from being met.  
 
12.6 PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 
(PHMSA) 
 
 PHMSA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that 
aims to protect people and the environment by enforcing standards, educating, and 
conducting research to prevent incidents in the transportation of energy. PHMSA is in 
charge of setting minimum safety standards for the siting of new LNG facilities, which 
the DOT received Congressional authorization for [10]. PHMSA addresses the siting 
requirements in respect to thermal radiation protection, flammable vapor-gas dispersion 
protection and wind forces. The CFR addresses these three factors, provides exceptions 
and details the modeling parameters that shall be used. NFPA (National Fire Protection 
Association) 59A-2001 is incorporated by reference in the CFR and contains the actual 
regulations concerning LUP in relation to new LNG facilities. The NFPA calls for 
provisions to be made to minimize the possibility of offsite consequences and defines 
procedures for calculating the possible effects of LNG facilities. The regulations apply to 
proposals for significant modification of existing facilities and to new LNG facilities 
after March 31, 2000, grandfathering LNG facilities constructed prior.  
It addresses the key components of establishing acceptable criteria, defining 
procedures for assessment methods, preventing future developments and appointing 
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competent governmental oversight but fails to address existing situations. It is only 
specific to only LNG facilities, as well. Nevertheless, 49 CFR 193 is the closest piece of 
regulation that the U.S. has to a LUP policy.  
 
12.7 FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
 The Fifth Amendment may be one more hurdle for a LUP policy in the U.S. to 
have to clear. An all-inclusive LUP policy will provide guidelines for the phasing-out or 
expropriation of land as a means to mitigate risk. This could be in the form of phasing-
out or expropriation of hazardous facilities or private property surrounding a facility. 
Either way, controversy is eminent.  
Among other things, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
protection to private property owners. It states that in order for the government to take 
private property it must be for public use and require just compensation. The definition 
of “public use” has historically been interpreted relatively strictly compared to what 
LUP would require. However, in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the Supreme Court 
loosely interpreted the definition of “public use” in favor of the governmental taking 
private property [42]. Although states have passed laws limiting the interpretation of 
public use, this decision opens the door of possibility for the LUP phasing-out and 
expropriation.  
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13. COMPARISONS 
 
 Comparisons between the major components of LUP policies around the world 
are helpful in an attempt to identify a best practice. Doing so, helps summarize the 
differences and identify the changes some countries have made. It is critical to be aware 
of the advancements countries have made in response to lessons they have learned and to 
learn from them as well. It is worth noting the changes France made in response to the 
incident in Toulouse, Germany’s progressions towards a CBA, and the Netherlands 
emphasis on phasing-out and expropriation. Therefore, there is no reason for the U.S. to 
implement a policy and have to go through the same growing pains as another country.  
 
Table 14 - Criteria & Approach Comparison 
 Germany [17] France [9] UK [19, 23] Netherlands 
[22, 43] 
US [35] 
# of Zones 2 or 3 [23] 4 3 2 1 
Criteria Based upon 
substance & 
quantity 
4 zones in 
risk matrix 
based on 
gravity & 
prob. 
Inner > 10
-5
 
Middle >10
-6
 
Outer > 
1
3
 * 10
-6
 
 
10
-5
 
10
-6
 
 
EPA’s 
RMP - 
Endpoints 
 
Approach Generic/Consq. Consq./Risk Consq./Risk Risk Consq.  
 
 
Table 14 shows the main differences between some of the world’s most notable 
LUP policies. Germany is prominent for its reluctance to incorporate QRA into the LUP 
process, thereby employing a combination of GSD and CBA. Consequently, Germany 
bases its zone criteria on the substances and their quantities. France is known for its 
changes to its LUP in 2003. Feeling their existing policy was inadequate, France 
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implemented a more thorough approach that incorporated probability assessments. 
France also, increased the use of maps and zones to inform the decision-making process 
as was seen in Table 9, Table 10 and Figure 3. The UK is notable for its unique 
combination for CBA and RBA. Moreover, the Dutch are notorious for their early and 
sole implementation of QRA. It is worth noting the U.S. is the only country in  
Table 14 that has only one LUP zone. This is due to the U.S. currently lacking a LUP 
policy and thus does not have a need for more zones. The general requirements of the 
EPA RMP call for end-point determination but do not set zoning or LUP restrictions that 
require the use of more zones.  
 
Table 15 - Risk Reduction Techniques & Zoning Comparisons 
 France  UK  Netherlands  US  
Community 
Awareness/ 
Emergency 
Response 
Seveso I Directive (82/501/EEC), Seveso III 
Directive (2012/18/EU) 
 
Emergency 
Planning & 
Community 
Right to Know 
Act of 1986, EO 
13650 
Inherently 
Safer Design 
Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC), Amendment in 2003 
(2003/105/EC), Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) 
 
Clean Air 
Amendments 
Act of 1990, EO 
13650 
 
Zoning/ 
Permitting 
PHMSA, ATF, 
California LUP 
Expropriation/ 
phasing-out in 
use 
 
Prime Minister 
has closed and 
reduced 
activities of 
plants [23, 43] 
Grandfathered 
in prior to 
1999 
 
Relatively large 
power to 
expropriate and 
has been used 
before [43] 
Extremely rare 
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 Table 15 displays the progress of four of the mentioned countries in their efforts 
to mitigate the risk surrounding hazardous facilities. The extent of LUP increases as you 
progress down the rows in the table. Community awareness and emergency response 
was the first step that several countries addressed in response to the gas leak in Bhopal, 
India. However, that alone is not sufficient in protecting the safety of employees and 
local communities. The next step was emphasis on inherently safer design and the 
implementation of state of the art safety technology. Countries have addressed the 
significance of inherently safer design to different extents. At one end of the spectrum, 
implementation of state of the art technology, regardless of cost, is enforced, and at the 
other end, cost-benefit analyses are used to determine the desired extent of 
implementation. The bottom two rows of Table 15 are where the separation between 
U.S. LUP policies and many other countries is evident. All EU member states are 
required to implement and enforce regulations for the zoning of hazardous facilities. The 
U.S., however, only has a state plan in California, PHMSA regulating siting of LNG 
facilities and the ATF regulating safety distances for the storage of explosives. All other 
chemicals, substances, states, and facilities not covered by these three pieces of 
legislation. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is almost unheard of for local communities to 
come together to push for phasing-out or expropriation are utilization for purposes of 
LUP.  
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14. PROS AND CONS OF IMPLEMENTING LUP IN THE U.S. 
 
 The U.S. currently has a number of regulations concerning safety distances to 
particular substances and LUP, creating jurisdiction confusion and overlap. 
Implementing an all-inclusive LUP policy that specifically addresses the key 
components of LUP (established tolerability criteria, defined approach and methodology, 
appoints competent governmental oversight, and addresses new and existing facilities as 
well as future growth around a facility) would eliminate this confusion and complexity. 
Separation distances and LUP provisions specified by particular industries or agencies 
such as the ATF for explosives or PHMSA for LNG facilities could be incorporated by 
reference in the new LUP policy. This allows competent authorities to establish LUP or 
separation distances that are at least as effective as the general provisions while also 
maintaining the new LUP policy as the foundation of LUP in the U.S. so that 
owners/operators and local planning authorities would always have the LUP policy to 
begin with. The jurisdiction confusion and overlap would also be minimized by 
appointing governmental oversight for LUP. Most importantly though, the fundamental 
reason for implementing a LUP policy in the U.S. is the reduction of potential 
consequences/risk to local communities with hazardous facilities. Limitations on land-
use, restrictions for future growth and prescribed safety distances are mitigating 
measures used by LUP to reduce risk.  
 However, implementing a LUP policy in the U.S. will have its critics and 
drawbacks. A perfect LUP policy does not exist and it has already been mentioned the 
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near impossible nature of identifying a universal best practice. Some people may object 
a change in LUP in the U.S., whether it is because they disagree with the approach, the 
costs, time and resources associated with LUP or the implications LUP has on urban and 
industrial development. In order for LUP to become heavily used in the U.S. more 
money, time and resources are required for the evaluation and calculation of separation 
distances. Setting up a LUP working group for competent governmental oversight also 
raises the costs of doing business. The primary drawback and cost of LUP will be the 
implications to urban and industrial development. A major part of LUP is the restrictions 
that it places on land-uses. It could be from limitations on developments, phasing-out or 
expropriation of establishments, or future restrictions within separation distances. 
Embargoing buffer zones around hazardous facilities will come at the cost of land 
development. Land within separation distances will not provide its maximum potential 
economically. Whether it is the hazardous facilities or local communities, someone will 
have to pay for the land within separation distances. This can be especially difficult for 
small companies who do not have a lot of money.  
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15. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Oil, gas and chemical industries are an essential part of the economy and are not 
disappearing any time soon. They have the potential to improve people’s lives, 
wellbeing and health as long as the risks involving the storage, handling and processing 
of hazardous chemicals are taken into account [37]. One way to address and mitigate the 
risks with LUP is to create buffer zones or implement development restrictions in the 
areas surrounding hazardous facilities. Unfortunately, the implementation and 
enforcement of adequate LUP is currently a near impossible accomplishment. An all-
inclusive best practice has yet to be identified and is not a reasonable expectation, 
primarily due to the dynamic nature of communities, the diverse set of factors that must 
be integrated into a policy and the diversity of countries around the world. However, 
there are specific characteristics of LUP that should be accounted for.  
LUP can be simplified into the key components of establishing acceptability 
criteria, approach/methodology, competent governmental oversight, new and existing 
facilities, and future growth. The establishment of acceptable criteria is closely 
connected with the application of LUP, on one hand, there is the motive to provide 
maximum safety; and on the other is the yearning to maximize the economic benefit of 
the surrounding areas. This creates quite the conundrum in trying to establish appropriate 
separation distances and developmental restrictions that provide adequate safety to the 
surrounding population while not hampering the economics of the community or facility. 
Ideally, separation distances should be large enough to ensure the safety of the 
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surrounding population. Countries have tinkered with the exact value, but, generally, a 
risk of less than 10
-6 
per year is the acceptable threshold. A more stringent risk value of 
10
-5
 per year is often used for more sensitive populations such as hospitals, schools and 
densely populated areas. In some cases, flexibility is introduced into the acceptable risk 
criteria by the ability of decision makers, in the planning process, to consider community 
preparedness and emergency response when determining acceptable risk criteria on a 
case-by-case basis. It is worth remembering that risk reduction techniques such as 
increased public awareness, improved emergency planning and inherently safer design 
can be used to lower separation distances and risk levels in addition to proper LUP. 
Some may believe that improving emergency response alone are the answer. However, a 
study found that the costs of improved emergency response was greater than the loss in 
value of restricted land use [43]. Also worth consideration is the notion that communities 
who do not have the technical expertise or infrastructure to sufficiently respond to 
hazardous incidents should not be approved as locations for oil, gas and chemical 
industries [4].  
Landowners, local residents, developers, city officials and other members of the 
public all are affected by LUP decisions. Future growth of the community could be 
hindered by embargoing land in buffer zones or developmental restrictions that could 
have provided favorable economics. Proposals for new hazardous facilities within 
existing communities provide employment opportunities for the local residents. 
Hazardous facilities, such as the West Fertilizer Company, benefit the community with 
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their services. LUP decisions have the greatest effect on local communities and thus 
should be involved in LUP.    
Defining the criteria for separation zones, number of zones to be used, particular 
developmental restrictions within each zone and, to an extent, even the methodology 
used to apply LUP are just formalities in the decision making process. The differences of 
these factors between countries are minute and hardly affect the outcome of LUP. This 
conclusion is supported by the findings that no significant difference was found in safety 
performance amongst EU member states [28]. Thus, the specific criteria and approach 
are not as important as applicability and extent of LUP. The critical components are the 
abilities to enforce LUP decisions and to minimize the potential consequences/risk to the 
community. Having competent authorities involved in the evaluation process and land-
use decision-making process is important to the success of LUP. Thus, a national 
working group that serves as the competent governmental oversight and works on 
harmonizing the approach used for LUP should be set up.  
France aimed to improve the efficiency of their LUP regulations in 2003 by 
increasing the limitations on future constructions surrounding hazardous facilities, 
incorporating risk analysis in the decision making process and addressing the vital issue 
of dealing with existing problematic situations surrounding hazardous facilities. They 
directly addressed some of the key components of LUP they believed were previously 
inadequate. It is important to note the French realized adjustments could be made in 
regulations regarding existing facilities and restrictions on future growth; that urban 
development should not take precedence over safety. They also aimed to standardize 
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their risk analysis procedures, a key component of applying LUP. Basing separation 
distances on inaccurate assessments leads to inadequate separation distances or excess 
amounts of land embargoed. Accurate assessments used in the LUP process are the 
foundation of LUP. Value lies in the lessons that France has learned and the changes that 
they have made to their LUP policy.  
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16. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. LUP 
 
Across the U.S., states and cities coexist with very different economic 
landscapes. The application of LUP and what is best practice for LUP in Alaska will be 
very different from a more industrial state such as Illinois or Texas. Thus, flexibility 
should be incorporated into the approach and methodology used for LUP in the U.S. At 
the national level, the EPA promulgates a LUP policy that specifies minimum safe 
operation distances to sensitive population areas, acceptable criteria and defines the 
approach. The EPAs RMP has already established end-point criteria for the evaluation of 
hazardous facilities using a consequence-based approach. Keeping this approach, the 
EPA promulgates a LUP policy that requires mitigation of consequences in the event of 
establishments within two defined safe operation distances. For example, in the event of 
thermal radiation, separation distances could be defined as 5 kW/m
2
 (inner zone) and 3 
kW/m
2 
(outer zone). Guidelines are required at the national level to address existing 
facilities, future growth and developmental restrictions. If hazardous facilities cannot 
utilize safety precautions and inherently safer design to minimize safe operation 
distances within acceptable levels then phasing-out or expropriation is desired. However, 
grandfathering existing facilities may be the only solution because phasing-out and 
expropriation in the U.S. is complicated by the Fifth Amendment and capitalism. 
Nevertheless, local communicates with existing hazardous facilities creating LUP issues 
should seek agreements with local residents and the hazardous facilities for reducing the 
potential effects of an incident. Guidelines promulgating developmental restrictions for 
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land within each separation zone are also required. Within the inner zone, (smaller 
separation distance) future growth and new establishments are prohibited. For the land 
between the two separation distances, schools, hospitals and densely populated 
establishments shall be prohibited. Proposals for the modification or expansion of 
existing facilities shall be prohibited if additional establishments are included within 
separation distances or the consequences are increased. Establishing a competent 
national working group whose goal is to harmonize the approach, provide consistency to 
LUP enforcement, and verify LUP calculations, is also necessary. Competent 
governmental oversight provided by a national working group within the EPA would 
also provide assistance to local or state planning authorities who make the LUP 
decisions.  
Flexibility is important to the ability to apply LUP to all 50 states with their 
various political, economic, urban and technological environments. Thus, states shall be 
allowed the option to implement state LUP policies that are at least as effective as the 
national regulations. This permits states the ability to implement or incorporate a risk-
based approach. The criteria for the two risk-based separation zones would be 
established by the national working group (10
-6
 for outer zone of new facilities, 10
-5
 for 
inner zone of new facilities). A risk-based approach may be preferable to highly 
industrialized states that place a very high value on land uses within cities such as 
Houston. While, states such as Alaska, will likely not prefer the additional costs, time 
and resources that a risk-based approach requires. States, who implement a LUP plan, 
shall set up a state level planning authority to implement and enforce the policy. The 
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national working group reserves the right to audit the state level LUP policy to ensure it 
is at least as effective, within compliance and being adequately enforced.  
LUP in the U.S. is community driven, especially for existing situations, and thus, 
should been involved in the decision-making process. Calculations of separation 
distances should be checked by the state or national working group but locally discussed. 
Calculations should also be made available to the public and shall be discussed with 
local planning authorities who have a stake in the decisions. Local planning authorities 
should also consult the state or national working group when development proposals 
arise near calculated separation distances.   
It would be a shame if it takes another incident like the one in West, Texas before 
the U.S. implements a LUP policy. The Congressional Research Service of the U.S. 
found thousands of facilities in all 50 states, which contain hazardous substances that 
present risk to Americans living nearby. Texas alone has over 1,400 facilities. They also 
found 89 facilities within the U.S. that put more than one million people at risk [44]. 
Incidents like Bhopal, AZF, West and Tianjin are waiting to happen all across the 
country. Effectively mitigating these risks using LUP in the U.S. by addressing the issue 
of hazardous facilities in close proximity to local communities will help preserve the 
country and prevent such disasters.  
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